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PRESIDENT'S NOTES 
Most military officers like to refer to 
themselves and to their occupation in 
terms of "professionalism." They like to 
consider themselves experts in a field 
that, according to one definition of 
professional, demands "advanced study 
in a specialized field." Indeed, the 
raison d'etre of the Naval War College is 
the professional development of of­
ficers. This is, as any true professional 
will recognize, far too narrow a defini­
tion-although advanced and continuing 
study throughout one's career is essen­
tial to professionalism. 
In the broadest sense, profes­
sionalism requires a high degree of skill 
and competence, but, more than that, 
professionalism is a state of mind which 
demands of those who would be called 
professionals the highest ethical stand· 
ards and morally responsible pattern of 
conduct. 
In the history of the Navy, prof es· 
sionalism has been manifested in many 
different ways-none, however, more 
unique or ennobling than the per­
formance of our prisoners of war in 
North Vietnam. 
One of the best expressions of how 
an organization can be enriched by the 
efforts of a few is to be found in the 
conduct of Comdr. Robert Naughton 
during his 6-year confinement in enemy 
hands. His was an extraordinarily pro· 
fessional response in a perilous situ· 
ation-a response that came largely from 
within, but one that was also influenced 
by his sense of responsibility to the 
organization of which he was a part. 
Commander Na ugh ton and his fellow 
prisoners have, in this issue of the 
Review, given us an example of which 
we can all be proud. 
lf we are to refer to ourselves as 
professionals, we must, each and every 
one of us, perform to a high profes­
sional standard in this larger definition 
of the word. These ideas of competence 
and personal commitment are certainly 
not new. Professor Gibbs' fine paper­
also in this Review-reflects Clausewitz's 
understanding of these ideas. Today, 
however, they take on special signifi­
cance. The American people no longer 
take for granted the performance of any 
of the professions, including the mili­
tary. The responsibility of professionals 
to their organization in this context is 
crystal clear. 
JULIEN J. LEBOURGEOIS 
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy 
President, Naval War College 
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Throughout the years of poUtlCal dissonance created by the Vietnam war1 the one 
element tI1at could command aJmost universal support in the United States was 
concern for our prisoners of war. Through an unswerving loyalty to themselves, their 
fellow prisoners, and to tlrn Nation as a who}e, these men 1 confined, torwred1 and 
used for poJitical propaganda, were able to teturn llome with a11 honor and dignity 
often lost by men in similar circumstances, (This article represents an abridged 
version of an extensive researc11 effort conducted by the author.) 
MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS OF 
AMERICAN PRISIONERS OF WAR 
HELD BY THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 
An article prepared 
hy 
Commaruler ltoherl J. Naughton, U.S. Navy 
Introduction, January 1973 wit• 
nessed the end of the longest continual 
armed conflict in the 200,year history 
of the United States. Sixty days after 
the signing of the Paris agreement1 the 
longest recorded incarceration of Ameri· 
can prisoners of war (POW's) ended for 
more than 500 men1 over 450 of whom 
had been held in the Democratic Repu b­
lic of Vietnam (DRV). Several of these 
men had endured more than 8 years as 
prisoners of the DRV, while one POW 
held by the Vie !Cong was detained over 
9 years. 
The POW's received a warm and 
tumultuous welcome from the people of 
the United States. This served to create 
a unanimity among Americans which 
had been lacking during the long years 
of the Vietnam conflict. The Nation 1s 
public display of pride and relief was a 
genuine show of interest and concern 
for utheir" POW's, 
The Vietnam POW's, however, were 
not the first prisoners of war who had 
received publicity. Those American men 
who had been held prisoners in all 
recent wars have been the subject of 
public examination, and their return to 
the United States has provided a great 
deal of human interest news copy. 
The post-Korean period was the most 
lucid example of such investigation. 
Eugene Kinkead 's widely read book, In 
Every War But One, based on 
The source material for this article is 
drawn £ram the author's 6 years of imprison· 
ment in the Democrallc Republic of Vietnam 
•-his experience and observations plus the 
narratives and reCTeclions of 118 other pris­
oners with whom he, at various times, shared 
a cell. 
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Ciausewitz 1.'i dictum that uwar is an 
extension of policy by other mea!ls u has 
become an artjcJe of faith for the 
military professional. While this concept 
provides a much needed theoretical 
framework for understanding and deal· 
ing with the phenome11on, his discussion 
on the moral (psychological) forces pro­
vides an equally illuminating insight into 
the dynamics of war. 
CLAUSEWITZ 
ON THE 
MORAL FORCES 
IN WAR 
15 
An article prepared 
by 
llr. Norman II. Gibbs 
Clausewitz was deeply concerned 
with why men fight, what it is that 
makes wars emerge and develop as they 
do 1 and what general factors contribute 
to victory and defeat. However, the 
writing and discussion about Clause• 
witz 's book On War which have taken 
place during the past 30 years or so have 
concentrated largely on his argument 
that "war is an extension of policy by 
other means. 0 It is undoubtedly an 
argument basic to his whole concept of 
the nature of wars that actually occur as 
distinct from any theoretical concept of 
war: or, to use his own words, it is an 
argument which helps explain the con· 
trast between real war on the one hand 
and absolute or ideal war on the other. 
But the view of war as an extension of 
policy was no discovery of Clausewitz, 
as I think he would have been the first 
to admit. We do him an injustice by 
stopping at that point. I believe that he 
has something equally significant to say 
about the importance of the moral 
forces in war. 
This is one of those points at which 
Clausewitz goes in a new direction in 
which he is concerned with the impor­
tance of the concept of ideology in war. 
But first a proviso. I think we have a 
tendency to be overly narrow in our use 
of the word "ideology H and, therefore, 
reduce its usefulness for our purpose. 
Ideologies are not just politica\ creeds. 
To be of full value in the analysis of 
warfare, or indeed any other part of 
social analysis, ideology should be seen 
as something more comprehensive than 
simply political doctrine; something 
which, operating in the hearts and 
minds of men, moves them and inspires 
them to action. Of course, it is true that 
"something" can often be identified 
with political doctrine and that such 
An adaptation of a lecture delivered at the 
Naval War CoUege, 
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In their studies of Woodrov1 Wilson and the First World War, most historians have
assumed that the near•pacifist Wilson had little appreciation for the concept of force 
as an extension of diplomacy, On more careful investigation, however, it becomes 
apparent that Wilson not only developed realistic and clearly articulated war goals 
but that he was able to coordinate his larger diplomatk purpose with the use of force 
perhaps better than any war President before or since, 
WOODROW WILSON AND THE RECONCILIATION 
OF FORCE AND DIPLOMACY: 1917-1918 
A lecture given al thi, Naval War College 
by 
l'rofessor ll.F. Trask 
The questions most frequently ad• 
dressed by historians in their study of 
American foreign policy during World 
War 1 normally concern either why the 
United States entered the war or why 
she ultimately rejected the postwar 
settlement, These questions lead schol• 
ars primarily to the study of neutrality 
from August 1914 to April 1917 and to 
an examination of peacemaking from 
November 1918 to March 1920. Un· 
fortunately, the period of actual combat 
has, until recently, been al! but ne· 
glected. 
One significant aspect of belligerency 
that has never been thoroughly ex· 
amined is the process by which Presi­
dent Wilson sought to apply the military 
and naval power of the United States in 
the service of larger political purposes 
during 1917-1918. Indeed, most his· 
torians seem to have assumed that 
Wilson, specifical!y, and the U.S. Gov• 
ernment1 in general, paid scant attention 
to this question. It is certainly true that 
Wilson gave less time to day-to-day 
operations than perhaps any other war­
time President; but if ever an American 
President put into practice the famous 
Clausewitzian dictum that warfare 
should be conducted to achieve funda­
mental political purposes, it was Wood· 
row Wilson. This notion of Wilson being 
a grand strategist par excellence is a 
direct contradiction to the generally 
held image of Wilson as a lofty and 
impractical idealist who knew little and 
cared less about the real world. Never­
theless, although the evidence supports 
the proposition that he was a profound 
idealist with high hopes for his country 
and for mankind 1 it also establishes 
Wilson as an example of the fact that 
realism and idealism often coexist in the 
27
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Soviet policy in the Middle East-aompliaated1 expensive, and often frustrating� 
met per!iaps its greatest setback on 18 July 1972 w!wn Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat announced the termination of the mis.don of tlw Soviet military advisers and 
experts in Egypt. Undaunted fiowever, Kremlin planners continued to pursue their 
goal of an "anti-imperialist" Arab union dependent on Russian arms and amenable to 
Russian influence, The Yorn Kippur war of 1973 apparently rewarded their efforts 
with success, but the long-sought prize of Arab sympathy was taken, if only 
temporarily, by their archival, the United States, via the diploma tic efforts of Henry 
Kissinger. 
SOVIET POLICY TOW ARD THE MIDDLE EAST 
FROM THE EXODUS OF 1972 
TO THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 
An article prepared 
by 
Dr. Robert 0. Frnedman 
Introduction. Since their 1955 arms 
deal with Egypt, Soviet policymakers 
have sought to establish the Soviet 
Union as the dominant power in the 
Middle East. The main thrust of this 
strategy has been simply to replace the 
Western Powers in their former posi� 
tions of political, military r and eco­
nomic influence within the region. The 
Soviet leaders have engaged in massive 
economic aid projects such as the 
Aswan and Euphrates Dams; they have 
contributed large amounts of sophisti­
cated military equipment to many of 
the states of the region; and more 
recently they have sought to consolidate 
their influence through long-term 
''Friendship and Assistance" treaties 
such as the ones signed with Egypt in 
l 971 and Iraq in l 972.
Yet1 as the expulsion of the Soviet
military forces from Egypt in 1972 
indicated, with or without treaties, 
Kremlin influence in the highly volatile 
Middle East remains quite limited. 
Soviet efforts have been plagued by the 
numerous interstate and intrastate con­
flicts common to Arab politics, by the 
incessant competition for leadership 
within the Arab bloc of nations-Egypt, 
Syria, traq1 Libya, and Saudi Arabia -
and by the problem of defining a proper 
role for the Communist Parties of the 
Middle East. Illegal in a number of Arab 
countries and viewed vrith suspicion in 
all of them, the Communist Parties have 
embarrassed the Russians on a number 
of oocasions. Most recently, Russian 
support for the Sudanese Communist 
Party in the abortive coup attempt 
against Sudanese President Ja'afar 
Nimeri in July 1971-an attempt which 
resulted in the decimation of the Suda­
nese Communist Party's leadership-all 
but ended Soviet-Sudanese relations. 
Finally, the Russians have had to 
cope wi th competition from the United 
States and Communist China which 
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That a vital interest of both the United States and the industrial West lies in free 
access to the Middle Eastern oil supply has been made abundantly clear by the 
embargo and s ubsequent increases in the price of oil. Threats to this vital interest 
range from Soviet adventurism to the inherent domestic instabilities of the region. A 
firm and mutually profitable relationship with Iran, perhaps the most militarily 
potent and politically stable state in the region, seems to be the best policy against 
realization of these threats. 
IRAN AND AMERICAN SECURITY POLICY 
IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
An article prnpared 
by 
Major Uard E. O'Neill, U.S. Air Force 
and 
Captain Paul R. Viotti, U.S. Air Force 
Introduction. In October 1973 the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Ex­
porting Countries (OAPEC) sent shock 
waves through the industrialized world 
when it decreased the overall produc­
tion of oil and embargoed the United 
States, Portugal, South Africa, and the 
Netherlands. The impact of these de­
velopments and a subsequent quantum 
rise in oil prices for the Western states 
and Japan was immediate and far reach­
ing. On both sides of the Atlantic and in 
Tokyo there were fears of recession and 
even depression, the possibility of mil­
lions unemployed, and of massive defi­
cits in the balance of payments. 
Although in the ensuing months the 
experts debated the magnitude of the 
cutback, the behavior of the indus­
trialized states suggested that they con­
sidered the threats both real and serious. 
Besides turning their attention to 
conservation measures and the develop­
ment of domestic oil and other energy 
resources, the developed nations began a 
search for long-term external petroleum 
supplies at reasonable prices. In their 
scramble to obtain Middle Eastern oil, 
the European countries and Japan 
moved quickly to endorse the Arab 
demand that the Israelis withdraw from 
all of the territories occupied in the 
June 1967 Middle Eastern war, actions 
which reflected the extreme depend­
ency of Japan (over 90 percent) and 
Europe (over 70 percent) on external 
sources of oil. Such a course of action 
was judged unacceptable by the United 
States which instead stressed active and 
intensive diplomacy as the best means 
to deal with the oil problem. The more 
moderate reaction on Washington's part 
was, of course, related to the fact that 
America was far less dependent on 
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INFORMATION 
COST 
AWARENESS 
The fact that management has virtu• 
ally chosen to ignore the cost of in­
formation highlights the need for an 
awareness of informational practices 
and their respective costs. Such an 
awareness can lead to culling out 11might 
need, nice to have" information and is 
essential to combat the development of 
those internal and external power bases 
that are detrimental to both the eco­
nomic and general health of the organi­
zationa.l whole. 
A research l'"I'"' prepared in the 
l)cfcnse Economies and l)ccisionmaking Course
al llic Naval Wm· College 
by 
Lieutenant Colonel Donald R, Miller, IJ,S. Marine Corps 
Although the seed for this paper was 
sown early in the Defense Economics 
and Decisionmaking course taught at 
the Naval War College, it could have as 
easily been planted in any management 
curriculum where the need for informa· 
tion is repeatedly stressed. Lectures on 
decisionmaking procedures, courses in 
ana,ytical methods, and case study dis· 
cussions atl drive one point home: in­
formation is invaluable. It is required to 
observe trends, develop statistical bases, 
conduct day-to-day operations, and re· 
duce the uncertainty from plans. How· 
ever, a curious thing develops during 
such courses: there is virtually no men• 
lion of the cost of information, It is as 
if information were a free and readily 
attainable commodity, available for the 
asking. Traditional economic theories 
on supply and demand, production, et 
cetera, evidently are not applicable to 
information. Similarly, although infor­
mation is an essential element in a 
cost/benefit analysis, managers have 
apparently found it convenient to give 
the problem less than full attention. 
Nevertheless, the collection, trans· 
mission, storage, processing, and distri­
bution of information obviously do 
have a hard dollar cost. In a personal 
sense this can be observed in outlays for 
newspapers, books 1 magazines, tele­
vision sets, tetephones, and education. 
Organizational activities rapidly extend 
this list by additional outlays for sophis· 
ticated communication and electronic 
processing equipmen t 1 special forms and 
reports, and staffs devoted to various 
aspects of the information process. The 
epitome of the situation probably rests 
with our bureaucratic Government 
where countless number of forms and 
reports alone cost the Nation billions of 
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